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The Value of a User for Codacy 
Abstract  
This research was developed in straight collaboration with the Portuguese startup           
Codacy with the purpose of valuing the different types of users by defining metrics for each                
segment created. The users were segmented according to their subscription plan — Cloud and              
Enterprise, Monthly Recurring Revenue (MRR) - Small, Medium and Big Accounts and            
subscription length - Monthly and Yearly. The main conclusion is that medium and big              
accounts are the main growth drivers. Furthermore, those metrics also provide powerful            
insights by enabling Codacy to be more data-driven across departments especially           
approaching Product Market Fit.  
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Software-as-a-Service Industry  
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) usually describes a software company distribution model in          
which applications are offered through a license on a subscription basis (monthly or yearly              
frequency) that is hosted centrally on a cloud service. The inception of this alternative of offering                
a software arises in the late 90s with a handful of major players such as SalesForce and NetSuite,                  
taking the lead. 
In the traditional software business, companies do most of their profits by selling a               
perpetual license for a software and selling add-ons of the new features. In this model, the client                 
pays an upfront value for the license plus a recurring annual maintenance fee to cover new                
upgrades. At the end of last decade, several players realized that the market was looking for a                 
new service where only the features used by the clients are charged with frequent upgrades, more                
friendly interfaces, and simultaneously, with higher security privacy and data protection           
standards. SalesForce was the first tech company addressing this new market by offering a              
platform of Customer Relationship Model (CRM) that is still nowadays the market leader and              
considered by younger companies a case study on how to create a successful SaaS business.  
Among the advantages of this type of services is the time spent on installation – since the                 
service is hosted on a cloud, there is no need to install or download neither the software nor any                   
updates – everything is done naturally without the client perception. This type of software              
delivery also offers the possibility to small and medium businesses (SMB) to use a service that                
they would never use as the high prices of a traditional software one time fee reduces drastically                 
the added value for those companies. As result of the wide use of SaaS in different industries                 




emerge in the market. Nowadays, companies like Hubspot grant users the possibility to integrate              
their software with services from third companies as for example Zendesk (customer support),             
allowing companies to have in the same place all the deals, with the intention to provide customer                 
support to those users. 
One of the major drawbacks of the SaaS industry is the lack of control by the users                 
over the software that they are using since their data is hosted in a cloud service provided by                  
a third company provider as for example AWS or Azure. Even so, this downside was used by                 
the market to create a new market — on-premises software — where the software is hosted                
on their client’ servers. The license prices are higher in order to overcome the fact that the                 
client has access to the code.  
 
Introduction to Codacy  
Codacy is a Portuguese startup that operates a SaaS model offering a platform that              
carries automatic code reviewing for developers enabling them to ship their products faster.             
On average, each developer spends 20% of the time reviewing code and 45% correcting bugs               
and managing technical debt (when code is written to be easy to implement in the short term                 
but it is not optimized to support future changes to the product which will require more time                 
to fix it in the long run). Currently, the company offers two plans – Cloud and Enterprise (on                  
premises). In the Cloud plan, the clients pay a subscription ($18 per month, $15 for the                
annual plan) which gives access to all the features available and for all the languages               
supported. In the Enterprise plan the price is not public and depends on several aspects.  
As stated before, for security and privacy reasons some companies do not want to host               
their data on a third company provider. Codacy, as most of the SaaS companies, offers the                




service. Codacy offers as well an open source service working as a freemium model — the                
users do not pay to use the service. In 2014, Codacy was the winner of the Web Summit pitch                   
competition, which further enabled its growth from 300 cities and less than 3,000 users to               
more than 6,000 cities and 60,000 users today.  
 
Statement of the Problem  
Codacy secured three rounds of financing — two seed rounds and the most recent              
Series A for a total of 6.7 million dollars. In the last round, the series was lead by EQT                   
Ventures — the european venture capital, and participation of Armilar Venture Partners,            
Caixa Capital and Faber Ventures. Today, Codacy has a product in the market, however, as               
most of the companies that raise a Series A, the Product Market Fit is still not well identified,                  
which is crucial to the future success of the company as well as critical to raise a Series B.                   
The best way of defining Product Market Fit is given by Marc Andreessen (2017) -               
“product/market fit means being in a good market with a product that can satisfy that               
market”​. 
When the company hits the perfect Product Market Fit, the churn rate ( percentage of               
users that cancel or downgrade their subscription) will be negative (upgrades are higher than              
downgrades and cancellations) and the customer lifetime value (average gross profit from a             
commercial relation with a user) will be one of the drivers of future growth with a major                 
impact on post-money valuations for a future investment round. Nonetheless, there is still a              
lot to be achieved before Codacy hits a Serie B milestone but taking into account the average                 
runway (how long a company can survive if the revenue and expenses stay constant), this               
financing is something that should be prepared in advance to avoid shortfalls of cash. This               




their financial consequences for the company and the impact of their behaviors on the              
strategies implemented over time on product, marketing and sales. By the end of this paper,               
we should be able to answer all these points. 
Literature Review 
Value High-Growth Businesses  
It is fair to say that the value of a company depends on the judgement of sellers and                  
buyers regarding the current and future cash flows. For SaaS in particular and tech companies               
in general, the net present value (NPV) of the future cash flows has been reduced to a simple                  
formula based on a multiplication of a multiple by the Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR).              
Among the reasons behind that is the disparity between the investment realized and the cash               
flows obtained, the absence of operating history and because most of the young tech              
companies do not make it through the early stages to succeed in the market. Consequently, it                
is not surprising that most of the literature available argue that the relative valuation might be                
more useful to value tech companies as a contrast to an intrinsic valuation.  
In an intrinsic valuation, the value of the company is estimated as a function of the                
cash flows generated. Accordingly, ​“assets with high and predictable cash flows should have             
higher values that assets with low and volatile cash flows” (Damodaran A.). There are four               
pieces that make an intrinsic valuation conceivable: cash flows from existing assets, expected             
growth, discount rate and viability of when the company will become a stable growth              
company.  
In a relative valuation, the value of a company is compared to the value assessed by                
the market for similar companies through a multiple. In order to do a relative valuation, a                




industry are related to the Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR). Aswath Damodaran mentioned            
on ​“Intrinsic Valuation in a Relative Valuation World” that 85% of all the equity research               
reports on Wall Street is based on multiples, and more than 50% of all acquisition valuations                
are based upon multiples. A relative valuation usually outperforms an intrinsic valuation as it              
reflects the perception that investors have of the market when similar companies are used,              
something that an intrinsic valuation cannot incorporate by simple discounting the cash flows             
of the company. But the key advantage of an intrinsic valuation for a tech company is the                 
limited information required.  
Tomasz Tunguz (2017) on the article ​“The Narrowing of SaaS Valuations”           
investigates the multiples practiced by the industry in recent history. The firm value multiples              
peaked in February of 2014 (7.7 times the ARR) and is around 5 times the ARR in 2017. The                   
variance within the industry is also much narrower today – “In 2014, forward revenue              
multiples ranged from 1x to more than 20x”. From 2015 onwards, the maximum outlier has               
10x. Tomasz Tunguz (2017) believes that the justification for the narrower of the multiples is               
justified by the fact that “investors have become more sophisticated ​in understanding these             
businesses and valuing them.” The second reason is there are fewer companies going public              
and the growth rates representative of the industry ​“are slowing at scale”​.  
Aswath Damodaran has spent part of the last years researching about the differences             
between valuing a tech company – where a value of a user is a key metric – and the                   
traditional methods of valuing companies based on revenue and cash flows. Those models do               
not suit to a modern economy where companies are more focused on growth and              
accumulating users and subscribers making them stick with the company for at least enough              
time to compensate the resources spent on acquiring the customer. For this reason, when we               




users/visits that they have and the time that each one spends on the platform. Consequently,               
the valuation process is done based on a bottom-up approach starting with the number of               
users instead of the conventional top-down approach. On the paper ​“Valuing young, startup             
and Growth Companies: Estimation Issues and Valuation Challenges”​(Damodaran A.) ​, the           
author reinforces this idea by saying ​“The fact that young companies have limited histories,              
are dependent upon equity from private sources and are particularly susceptible to failure all              
contribute to making them more difficult to value.”  
Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart and David Wessels (1990) on the book ​“Measuring and             
Managing the Value of Companies” suggest that the intrinsic valuation based on discounted             
cash flows work well even for high-growth companies since the core principles of finance              
and economics are reflected in the discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation model. In their              
analysis, they highlight the imprecision of the relative valuation methods given the example             
of the price-earnings multiples as an example, because they ​“generate imprecise results when             
earnings are highly volatile, cannot be used when earnings are negative and provide little              
insight into what drives the company’s valuation” ​(Koller et al., 1990, 691). 
The authors also pointed out the disparity between the traditional DCF model and a              
DCF model applied to high growth companies where the historical financial results are             
assessed beginning with the future and then the past. For this reason, to make this exercise a                 
well-defined point in the future has to be delimited, at the time when the company's financial                








Trade-off between Growth and Profitability  
For many years, most companies have been driven by profits as a measure of success.               
However, in the recent history of the expansion of the internet and the growth of venture                
capital, more and more people have been defending that growth is more important than              
profitability. Jon Markman (2017) outlines this on the Forbes’ article where he states that              
“profits are so yesterday” being what really matters the ​“vision and great storytelling” ​of the               
companies.  
The present article uses the case of Amazon to validate his opinion. Amazon was              
created in 1994 by Jeff Bezos and was initially a website focused on selling books. The                
company has become the fourth largest company in the USA, although in these 23 years, only                
had a few profitable quarters. The reasons pointed out are the capacity of tech companies like                
Amazon, to efficiently raise large amounts of capital from the market allowing them to take               
riskier projects in markets not yet explored as for example, in Amazon case, cloud computing               
businesses or movie studios for streaming. This set the stage for copycat by companies like               
Tesla or the recent IPO of Snapchat, both of them with large public valuations without a                
single record of profits. By replacing growth for profitability, the investors are betting that              
those tech companies will either public or will be acquired by market leaders capable of               
paying the multiples currently practiced in the industry.  
Lastly, it is important to define which is the threshold between growth and             
profitability currently used by the market. The authors Eric Kutcher, Olivia Nottebohm and             
Kara Sprague (2014) on the paper ​“Grow fast or die slow” have collected data from 3,000                
software and online-services companies between 1980 and 2012 and the conclusions are            
appealing. ​The first conclusion of the study was that ​“high-return companies offer a return to               




whose growth was greater than 60 percent when they reached $100 million in             
revenues—were eight times more likely to reach $1 billion in revenues than those growing              
less than 20 percent.” Finally, the authors also reached the conclusion that achieving a              
sustainable growth is extremely hard — ​“just 28 percent of the software and internet-service              
companies reached $100 million in revenue, and 3 percent reached $1 billion”.  
Mark Suster (2017) in the article ​“Should Startups Care About Profitability”           
reinforces this idea of growth being more important than profitability by the fact that the               
resources needed today to fund growth will only come after six months or even one year. The                 
author gives the example of salespeople to justify this assumption. When a company hires              
sales representatives, they might not close any deal for six months due to the learning curve                
to learn on how to sell the product and understand the procedures in practice by the company.                 
Therefore, profitability will go down by six months to grow dramatically afterwards. 
 
Customer Retention  
In a competitive market as the technology industry, economies of scale and market             
share have an important rule when new rounds of financing are being prepared. Saying that,               
acquiring and retaining new customers is one of the main concerns of top managers. At the                
beginning of a SaaS company, churn rate metrics are not as important as when the product is                 
already well defined and the market fit fully settled by the market. When a company starts                
preparing a Series A round of financing, the values asked are typically between 5-10 million               
of dollars with a pre-money valuation between 15-45 million dollars and consequently,            
investors want to be sure that the company has the fundamentals to prosper in the market, and                 




With the Product Market Fit settled, one of the most important metrics is by far the                
churn rate. J. Epstein, Marc and Manzoni, Jean-François (2008, 208) defined retention rate             
“as the proportion of customers active at the period t-1 who are still active at the end of                  
period t, while churn rate for a given period is defined as the proportion of customers active                 
at the end of period t-1 who dropped out in period t”​. There are two types of churn: customer                   
churn rate and revenue churn rate. Customer churn rate is the percentage of total customers               
who churned in a given period of time. This metric does not provide a true image of the                  
financial landscape of the company because the company can lose a large number of clients               
but each one representing a low value. Therefore, revenue churn is more relevant to              
understand a company’s ability to satisfy and retain customers, representing the percentage of             
recurring revenue lost due to churned customers. There are two types of revenue churn: gross               
and net churn. Gross churn only takes into account the users that have churned or               
downgraded their plans. Net churn also includes the positive effect of customers that have              
upgraded their subscription. Consequently, the goal of any company is to achieve a point              
where the upgrades by itself are enough to repay the churn and downgrades and achieve a                
growth rate only from the existing users – which have a lower cost to sustain them to acquire                  
new ones. Kate Harvey (2016) on the article “​The 10 reasons SaaS Customer Churn (and               
how to combat them)​” refers that among the reasons for a customer churn are a bad                
onboarding of the service, mainly helping users to achieve their first big success with the               
service. “If you’re too slow in helping them reach their first success, you’re going to see                
churn, as they look for more immediate ways to reach their goals.”​. Not defining customer               
support as a priority by the management is another reason pointed out by the author for                




adaptation of the users to a new service but also encourages upgrades. There is also the                
possibility of customer churn because the service provided by a competitor is simply better.  
 
Lifetime Value of a Customer  
LTV is the net present value of the future gross profits of a customer and gives a                 
crucial insight into how much money a company should be spending on acquiring each              
customer to be profitable in the long run. LTV is usually described in the literature as ​“sum of                  
cumulative cash flows — discounted using the weighted average cost of capital - of a               
customer over the entire lifetime with the firm.”  
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Equation I: LTV Formula 
Nonetheless, LTV is a tool - and not a strategy - with too many inputs that are outside                  
of managers control, like ARPA and CAC (Cost of Acquisition). Additionally, the variables             
used are ​“interdependent not independent and are an overly simplified abstraction of            
reality”. ​For example, if a company increase prices (ARPA), churn should increase as a              
consequence. On the other hand, if managers spend more money on marketing, CAC will              
increase which could increase Churn could also increase as we would be attracting customers              
of a lower quality. To sum up it, it is theoretically impossible to have all the metrics of LTV                   
increasing at the same time.  
 







In the last decades, the freemium platforms have become the business model used by              
tech companies to grow their users base, in which a customer get some of the features for free                  
and can unlock the remaining features by paying a subscription fee. A free tier has shown to                 
be a successful alternative to a 30-day free trial or other limited offers because customers find                
the opportunity to use the product for free more compelling.  
Therefore, the driver of growth is the conversion rate from page views to signups and               
at a later date from signups to paying users. Codacy started by operating in 2014 with a full                  
freemium model, as many of other B2B SaaS companies, that has shown to be the most                
effective model to reach a meaningful user base to experiment the product and to figure out if                 
the product has enough market fit to succeed in the market. As the time went on, paying                 
subscription plans were added to the portfolio, and the freemium model became only             
available for open source projects. 
Regarding conversion rates from a free user to a paying user in a freemium model, a                
rate of 1% is too low — meaning that the company is offering too much for free or                  
consumers do not value the premium features to pay for them. On the other side, a conversion                 
rate of 50% is too high because it means that the platform has no ability to generate the same                   
number of leads needed in the future to keep the sales pipeline working, in other words, the                 
potential to acquire new customers in the future is limited. The conversion rate of Codacy, as                
for any other tech company, is a strong indicator of the potential value of new users — since                  




with higher conversion rates will have a higher user value, since the cost to acquire a user                 
will be kept constant over time. 
For this reason, the first step to evaluate a user and the impact on the overall company                 
structure is to estimate the conversion rates. If the conversion rate from page view to trials is                 
high and for instance the conversion rate from trial to paying user is low — it could mean that                   
there is interest from the market to test the product, but not enough to pay for it. In fact, a                    
B2B SaaS company which has higher conversion rates than most of the tech companies, since               
the product offered is to a specific market that when visits the web page is already showing                 
some interest in paying for the subscription. Codacy has currently conversion rates in line              





Figure II: Conversion Rates Funnel 
 
Cohort Analysis — Retention Rates 
A cohort is a group of customers that share a common characteristic over a period of                
time. It helps to understand if a specific group is actually getting better over time or if it is                   
churning/downgrading the subscription. This sets the stage to evaluate the different groups of             
customers over time and find patterns in the product commercialization and consumer            
behavior. After all, cohort analysis involves looking at a group of people over time and               




and the product lifetime on the vertical axis of the retention table. Consequently, the users               
were segmented accordingly with the subscription plan (Cloud and Enterprise), subscription           
length (Yearly and Monthly) and size of the account based on MRR (Figure III). This               
particular segmentation was chosen because within each segment the results are expected to             
be different, for instance, if a user pays annual, Codacy has a full year to work on the                  
onboarding of the user until the next renewal. Additionally, in the meanwhile, the user cannot               
churn, as it has already paid for one year upfront which is why annual contracts are much                 
more valuable for Codacy. The same happens for accounts with larger MRR — which have a                
bigger LTV:CAC (ratio between the Lifetime Value of a Customer(LTV) and Cost of             
Acquisition (CAC)) value for the company since there are economies of scale in acquiring              
these clients.  
The most remarkable conclusion from the revenue retention cohort is as the time goes              
by, the most recent cohorts have a better performance than the older ones which means that                
Codacy is being able to improve the onboarding process which also reflects it is adding               
Product Market Fit. The cohort for the monthly data has a similar behavior throughout the               
different cohorts, which demonstrates the weight that monthly contracts still have on the             
overall MRR of Codacy. Even so, the annual cohort still provides important insights about              
the behavior of a user, mostly when compared with a monthly subscription user. The              
behavior of the annual cohorts is steading over time, which is a consequence of the payment                
of a full year upfront, which reduces the incentive to cancel before the renewal date. The                
behavior of the monthly and yearly cohorts will be used as part of the analyses of the main                  
segments created in this research - small, medium and big accounts.  
One should be aware that the weight of the Enterprise compared to the Cloud segment               




because there is no real variance over time, apart from the renewal date that happens only                
once a year. On account of the limitations of Cloud vs Enterprise segmentation, was              
segmented the clients according to their MRR: small accounts are the ones with an MRR               
lower than $500, average accounts between $500 and $1,000 and big account higher than              
$1,000. In fact, there are subscriptions that are in the Cloud segment but have a higher MRR                 
that some of the enterprise clients, which makes this analyses more helpful for the scope of                
the project. It is worth noting that the on the small accounts, the retention rate drops over time                  
in all the cohorts presented in the Appendix. With this analysis it was possible to identify the                 
type of users with more churn tendencies over the past few months and it was concluded that                 
most of this churn comes from freelancer developers — who subscribe Codacy only when              
they have big projects and pre-series A startups that are still testing their product on the                
market. This implies that the value of the small users is low for Codacy when compared with                 
the cost that it was acquiring them since they do not stick enough time to recover the money                  
invested in their acquisition. Clearly, the most valuable users at the moment for Codacy are               
the medium and big accounts, since these are the cohorts with the strongest retention rates               
over time. This means that Codacy is retaining these users for long enough to cover at least 3                  
times the CAC and at the same time being able to upgrade their accounts - part of the ​land                   
and expand sales strategy ( (start with small teams of developers and progressively expand              
inside the companies).  
Surprisingly, the big account cohort has a similar performance to the medium            
accounts which reinforces the idea that current user base should not be the growth driver in                
the future, since it is the one that presents the worse retention ratios as well as the lower LTV.                   
These numbers are slightly lower than the values expected at the beginning of the cohort               




from a small account user base to a medium/big account user base. The evidence from the                
cohorts analysis points towards the idea that the lifetime value of a user will be larger for                 
enterprise and annual contracts. 
 
User Lifetime Value  
1. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
Before computing the number of months that a user sticks with Codacy on average,              
there are several inputs that have to be computed. The first one is the Weighted Average Cost                 
of Capital (WACC) which gives the average cost between the two sources of financing —               
Debt and Equity. The value raised in the last round of financing by Codacy will be used as a                   
proxy for the value of Equity and, as with most of the tech companies, debt will be assumed                  
to be 0, since the most common source of financing is equity from venture capitalists or                
investment funds. The companies that were used to calculate the beta for Codacy were: Box               
(cloud storage), Workday (HR and financial management software), Shopify (e-commerce          
company), Salesforce (CRM Software), Zendesk (customer service software), Hubspot         
(Inbound marketing and sales) and Spluk (software company). The criteria used to select             
these companies was: public companies in USA which the core business of            
business-to-business (B2B) software service. It should be noted that only American           
companies were considered because the tech market in Europe is still underdeveloped with             
few public companies - the major European tech company is SAP and it constitutes alone               
42% of the Top 100 in company revenue, being almost eight times bigger than the second                
company on the list.  
Considerable attention must be taken to the expected return of the market. For a              




index. However, for a young tech company the risk associated is larger. Hence, the expected               
return of a venture capital fund was used as proxy for the returns of the market. In an                  
ordinary venture capital portfolio, the returns expected by the investors is likely a binary              
result - either the investment fails or grant a generous gain. ​“Historical venture capital              
performance shows that 5-10% of investments generate 60% of the VC returns”​. Cambridge             
Associates projects that on average the return of a VC is equal to 17.70% per year. In this                  
paper a WACC equal to 26.18% will be used to all future computations.  
2. Average Revenue per Account (ARPA) 
There are two types of ARPA: new and existing. The new ARPA takes into account               
only the new subscriptions and helps understanding if the value of new accounts is higher               
than the value of the existing ones. For the purpose of this research, the ARPA for the                 
existing customers is used for the three segments, bearing in mind that medium and big               
accounts have similar behaviors by which will be evaluated both at once. As expected, there               
are few accounts with a medium/big dimension with a higher MRR — which is explained by                
the dimension of each team of developers in these accounts. Therefore, the ARPA for the               
medium/big accounts for the last seven months has an average value of $2,000 and for the                
small accounts of $300.  
3. Gross Margin  
The third metric needed to compute the LTV for each segment is the gross margin of                
Codacy split by account size. The gross margin is a reflection of how much a dollar of                 
revenue is valuable to Codacy. A good benchmark for a SaaS company is around 70-80%,               




engineering and marketing salaries. In order to differentiate the gross margin for small and              
medium/big accounts a few points should be mentioned in order to allocate the right              
percentage of COGS for each one. The small accounts are more cost demanding mostly              
because most of them pay monthly which increases the cost with payment terminals like              
Stripe, credit card providers or Paypal. It should be noted as well that small accounts tend to                 
be more customer support demanding based on historical internal data. The reasons for this              
result are not yet completely understood but the fact that the teams with lower number of                
users, makes them more demanding for support. The COGS imputed to medium/big accounts             
is overstated if the percentage of MRR versus total MRR was used as weight, because most                
of those accounts are on-premise solutions — no cost with servers for Codacy. The present               
findings have important implications to define the gross margin for each segment. 
4. Cost of Acquisition (CAC) 
The investment that a company does acquiring new customers is one of those metrics              
that a Head of Sales and a CEO have to be always aware of in order to have a clear idea of                      
the current growth of the company and future profitability that this growth can represent.              
Notwithstanding, the lack of information regarding the average cycle of a deal for the small               
accounts in contrast to the medium/big accounts it is predicted that the number of months that                
a sales representative needs to close a bigger deal is higher than for a small account which                 
will impact the overall CAC for each segment.  
5. Lifetime Value of a Customer (LTV)  
Once we know how much Codacy will invest to acquire a new user for each one of                 




most common metric adopted is the LTV, since it takes into consideration the several aspects               
of the interaction between the user and the company — how long the user stays with the                 
company (retention rate), cost with the retention (gross margin), the growth rate of the              
company and the intrinsic discount rate. Making use of the segmentation done before, the              
LTV value will be computed for both segments assuming the same growth rate and discount               
rate. However, extreme caution must be exercised regarding the growth rate, since in the              
future it is expected to be the medium segment the main growth driver of any SaaS company.                 
Hence, the LTV for the small accounts is lower than the LTV for the medium/big accounts                
which translates that these ones are more profitable for the company.  
Conclusions and Limitations 
For a company that recently closed a Series A, the top priority is to grow the number                 
of users and revenue in order to fulfil the milestones defined by the market to fund a Series B.                   
As part of the growth strategy of Codacy, achieving Product Market Fit as well as targeting                
the more profitable users is mandatory. This research paper is only the first step to analyse                
the problem and define the metrics for the future. It is plausible that a number of limitations                 
might influence the conclusions presented, in consequence of Codacy being one of the fastest              
growing SaaS startups in Europe. Most of the assumptions are built on top of historical               
metrics, which will be unreliable in a near future and therefore should be updated              
systematically. As an example, the thresholds were defined based on current cohorts, but as              
Codacy starts to target bigger deals, the values should be adjusted to reflect the new reality.  
Being aware of those limitations, the conclusions that we can take from the current              
data are that Codacy, as most of the SaaS companies, have a higher percentage of MRR                




come to Codacy, mostly through Organic channels — the user visit the webpage signup and               
starts to pay. Currently, Codacy has higher conversion rates than the benchmark. However,             
the value of those users is significantly low, since they do not stay with Codacy enough time                 
to recover in LTV the value spent in acquiring them (CAC), even if this cost is small — as                   
concluded from the cohorts analysis. From a cash flow perspective, those segments are also              
the ones with less value, since most of them pay monthly, which increases the probability of                
churn events, as well as reducing their importance from a cash flow point of view.  
On the other side, the medium/big accounts and Enterprise users have a higher cost of               
acquisition, because even starting organically, Codacy has to spend resources on their            
expansion as part of the sales strategy which is based on land and expansion of organizations                
(start with small teams of developers and progressively expand inside the companies). Even             
with a higher CAC for Codacy, the LTV is also higher, since from the cohort analysis is                 
possible to conclude that these users tend to stay with Codacy for long periods of time and                 
actually upgrading their accounts. These segments tend to pay one year upfront which allows              
Codacy to finance their operations with annual contracts.  
All in all, this paper will give the data and metrics that Codacy need to become more                 
data driven and define sales, marketing, growth and product strategies for the future             
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